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A FRAMEWORK FOR REFORMING THE INDEPENDENCE 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF STATUTORY OFFICERS OF 
PARLIAMENT: A CASE STUDY OF VICTORIA  
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Considerable attention has been given to the independence of auditors-general in the 
literature.  However, there are other officers of parliament who also have roles that 
may require protection from the excessive use of power by the executive arm of 
government.  In response to the recent Public Accounts and Estimates Committee 
Inquiry into a Legislative Framework for Victorian Statutory Officers of Parliament, 
the study compares the enabling legislation of four Victorian officers of parliament 
in terms of their powers, independence, funding, and mandate as well as the 
accountability mechanisms available to parliament in terms of their appointment, 
tenure, and oversight.  The four officers are: the auditor-general; the ombudsman; the 
regulator-general; and the director of public prosecut ions.  A number of notable 
differences in the enabling legislation are identified and reform options for 
strengthening such legislation are presented.   
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Introduction 
Considerable attention has been given to the independence of auditors-general in the 
literature.  However, within that literature there has been limited comparison of the 
provisions within their enabling legislation that provide for their independence as 
well as their accountability.  Further, auditors-general are only one of a number of 
independent parliamentary officers with roles that may require protection from the 
excessive use of power by the executive arm of government. 
 
Therefore a key motivation of this study is to examine the legislative provisions for 
the independence and accountability of other officers of parliament in addition to the 
auditor-general.  Although the independence and accountability provisions as 
contained in the enabling legislation of the auditors-general of Australia have been 
compared (De Martinis and Clark forthcoming), a similar comparison of the 
legislative provisions for the independence and accountability of other officers has 
not been undertaken.  Examining the enabling legislation of other officers of 
parliament is important because such officers also contribute to the enhancement of 
government and public sector accountability (Mulgan 1997).      
 
Further motivation comes from examining the enabling legislation of two officers of 
the parliament of Victoria that have received government and media attention.  The 
enabling legislation of the director of public prosecutions underwent significant 
challenge during 1994 (Corns 1994; Zifcak 1997).  Also, a number of changes to the 
enabling legislation of the auditor-general of Victoria were made by the Kennett 
government and the subsequent Bracks government (Craswell 1997; English and 
Guthrie 2001; Houghton and Jubb 1998).   
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Therefore, it is not surprising that in April 2000, the Victorian Public Accounts and 
Estimates Committee (PAEC) commenced an inquiry into a legislative framework 
for Victorian statutory officers of parliament.  The PAEC was to undertake an 
inquiry and report on:  
 
1. An appropriate legislative framework for Victorian officers of 
Parliament such as the Ombudsman, the Auditor-General and other 
statutory office-holders, that would recognise the special position of 
statutory officers of the Parliament in terms of their relationship with 
the Victorian Parliament but which also ensures that their greater 
autonomy is accompanied by very clear accountability requirements; 
and  
 
2. Developments in this area in other jurisdictions. 
 
The PAEC inquiry follows an earlier similar inquiry conducted in New Zealand 
Inquiry into Officers of Parliament (Finance and Expenditure Committee 1989).  The 
New Zealand inquiry recommended conferring the status of “Officer of the 
Parliament” to officers who should be afforded protection from the arbitrary use of 
power by the executive arm of government, with such positions being created only 
rarely.  Whilst proposing protection from the excesses of the executive, the 
Committee recommended a number of mechanisms to ensure that, in turn, the 
officers of parliament were accountable to parliament.  The PAEC has not yet 
presented a report on its findings and recommendations.   
  
5 
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to compare the enabling legislation of four statutory 
officers of parliament in Victoria with regard to their accountability to parliament as 
well as their independence from the parliament, including the adequacy of their 
powers, funding, and mandate.  The four Victorian statutory officers of parliament, 
who may be considered to be officers of the parliament in terms of their relationship 
with parliament, are: the auditor-general (Audit Act 1994); the director of public 
prosecutions (Public Prosecutions Act 1994); the ombudsman (Ombudsman Act 
1973); and the regulator-general (Office of the Regulator-General Act 1994).  As at 
January 1, 2002, the Office of the Regulator-General became the Essential Services 
Commission.  These officers were chosen to provide a sample that may be perceived 
as representing key officers of the parliament, regardless of whether their enabling 
legislation explicitly identifies them as such.   
 
This comparison of the enabling legislation allows for the identification of provisions 
that could be enhanced to further strengthen the independence and accountability of 
the officers.   Such a comparison enables the identification of the differences in the 
enabling legislation, where the differences found are used to assess relative strengths 
and weaknesses of the enabling legislation with respect to the independence and 
accountability provisions.  The identification of weaknesses subsequently justifies 
the presentation of reform options in the conclusion.           
 
In order to assist the PAEC to report on an appropriate legislative framework for 
Victorian (or other) officers of parliament, and following on from JCPA (1996, 
1989) and English and Guthrie (2000), this study uses an independence and 
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accountability framework as a basis to examine the current legislative frameworks 
applicable to the above four parliamentary officers with regard to independence, 
mandate, and funding issues.  Also compared are the accountability mechanisms 
available to parliament in terms of their appointment, tenure, and oversight.  The 
model developed by English and Guthrie (2000), in respect of auditors-general, is 
adapted here as a model that can have wider application to other officers of 
parliament.  Thus the model provides a framework that can be adopted by legislators 
in considering reforms to the enabling legislation provisions for independence and 
accountability of independent officers of parliament.    
 
Interestingly, in Victoria, the term ‘parliamentary officer’ does not appear to be 
clearly defined.  There is a Parliamentary Officers Act 1975, with the officers 
identified within that Act being the clerks of each House of Parliament and other 
similar staff who work within Parliament House.  Particular enabling legislation that 
creates an officer may refer to that officer as being an officer of the parliament.  For 
example the auditor-general is referred to as an officer of the parliament in the 
Constitution Act 1975, Section 94 B(1).  If the term is taken to mean officers who are 
appointed by the parliament, or by the governor- in-council on its behalf, then an even 
wider scope of the notion of officers of parliament is created.  Barrett (1996a: 138) 
states that “it remains an open question at this point in time as to what being an 
‘Officer of the Parliament’ means in practice, particularly in relation to the audit 
office itself.”  Therefore, before any legislative framework is developed, it will be 
necessary to provide an appropriate and adequate definition.  Note, however, it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to identify those officers who should be deemed to be 
independent statutory officers of parliament. 
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The paper is structured as follows.  The next section provides a review of the key 
literature and, in particular, presents the independence and accountability framework 
that forms the basis of the analysis.  Using this framework, the enabling legislation of 
the four Victorian officers of parliament is then compared.  Finally we present a 
summary and conclusion including reform options for strengthening the enabling 
legislation based on the findings.  The reform options are justified in their attempt to 
address the findings.  
       
Key Literature  
 
Literature on public sector accounting, accountability, and auditing is extensive (see, 
for example, English and Guthrie 1991; Funnel and Cooper 1998; Mulgan 1997; 
Taylor 1992 and Zifcak 1997).  In particular, the literature gives considerable 
attention to the 1997 review of Victoria’s Audit Act 1994 (Maddock, Dahlsen, and 
Spencer 1997) and the apparent threats to the independence of the Auditor-General 
of Victoria (Craswell 1997; De Martinis, Clark and Roberts 1998; English and 
Guthrie 2001; Guthrie and English 1997; Houghton and Jubb 1998).  This incident 
involving the Auditor-General was preceded by a similar incident in 1993 involving 
attempts to restructure the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions.  Corns 
(1994: 277) cites the claim made by the then director of public prosecutions, Bernard 
Bongiorno Q.C.:  
…that the proposed reforms would effectively undermine prosecutorial 
independence and allow political considerations to influence key prosecution 
decisions and structures. 
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In recent times the literature has acknowledged a model of accountability that 
comprises a number of complementary ‘agencies’, processes, and channels of 
accountability between the public and public servants (Mulgan 1997).  Figure 1, 
sourced from Mulgan (1997), depicts the ‘agencies’ of accountability to include 
freedom of information legislation, courts, ministers, parliament, and committees and 
officers of parliament including the ombudsman and the auditor-general.  The four 
main processes of accountability comprise reporting or accounting, information-
seeking or investigation, assessment or verification, and direction and control.  The 
agencies can ensure the accountability of governments or public servants through a 
number of channels.  However, the literature acknowledges that the effectiveness of 
these accountability agencies, particularly in the context of the role of public sector 
audit, depends on the existence of legislative provisions that ensure independence 
and adequate funding, as well as powers related to a comprehensive mandate (Barrett 
1996a, 1996b; De Martinis and Clark forthcoming; De Martinis, Clark, and Roberts 
1998; English and Guthrie 2001, 2000, 1991; Funnell, 1997, 1996; Taylor 1996a, 
1996b).   
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Debate on the role of public sector audit in public accountability represents a 
significant part of the literature on pub lic accountability (see, for example, De 
Martinis, Clark, and Roberts 1998; English and Guthrie 2000, 1991; Funnell and 
Cooper 1998; Mulgan 1997; Taylor 1992; Walsh 1995).  English and Guthrie (2000) 
present a framework on the independence and accountability for auditors-general, 
which this study adapts to facilitate an examination of the appropriateness and 
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adequacy of current legislative frameworks of all parliamentary officers with regard 
to mandate, independence, and funding issues.  The adapted framework provides the 
basis for reporting on an appropriate legislative framework for the Victorian officers 
of parliament that: (i) recognises the special position of statutory officers of the 
parliament in terms of their relationship with the Victorian Parliament; and (ii) 
ensures that their greater autonomy is accompanied by very clear accountability 
requirements.   
 
Comparison Of The Enabling Legislation Of Victorian Officers Of Parliament 
 
Based on landmark reports on the Commonwealth Auditor-General by the Joint 
Committee of Public Accounts (JCPA) (JCPA 1996, 1989), English and Guthrie 
(2000) examine the role, powers, and independence of the Commonwealth Auditor-
General in the context of the accountability mechanisms available to parliament, as 
per Table 1.  The two-part framework describes (i) the  accountability mechanisms 
available to parliament related to audit scope, auditor-general appointment, tabling 
of reports, funding, and oversight, and (ii) the powers required by auditors-general 
to conduct audits related to independence, mandate and funding source.  On the 
accountability mechanisms available to parliament (that is, Table 1: column 1), 
discussion includes issues related to the appointment of the officers, their scope of 
function, powers of parliament or other officers/committees in relation to each 
officer, and funding and oversight of the officers.  On the powers granted to perform 
duties (that is, Table 1: column 2), discussion includes issues related to scope and 
mandate, independence from direction/control by the executive, and funding.   
 
  
10 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
On the issue of accountability, Table 1: column 1 presents mechanisms available to 
the parliament in respect of the auditors-general.  These include no impediment to 
the scope of the auditor-general in conducting financial statements and performance 
audits all government entities.  Further, that parliament have powers to appoint and 
oversee the office of the auditor-general, as well as to request audits and have all 
audit reports tabled in parliament.  The parliament is the client, not the executive or 
auditee.  In respect of funding, the model proposes that funding be determined by the 
parliament with input from the parliamentary audit committee.  Finally, that there be 
oversight of the office of the auditor-general through an independent audit of the 
auditor-general.  These accountability mechanisms available to parliament in respect 
of the auditor-general can be generalised to provide a framework for evaluating the 
accountability of other officers of parliament, to the parliament. 
 
On the issue of independence, both public and private sector auditors are required to 
comply with professional standards such as AUP 32 (AuSB 2002).   In general, AUP 
32 states that auditors should be, and appear to be independent from the auditee.  
This requirement could apply to other officers of parliament with respect to the 
executive or government of the day.  Table 1, column 2 contains more specific 
independence requirements applicable to auditors-general and, again, these are 
adapted within this study for other officers of parliament.  These requirements 
include the need for an adequate mandate, as well as the need for sufficient funding 
as recommended by parliament to enable the effective exercise of such mandate.  
Other necessary powers relate to independence from direction by the executive by 
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way of having such independence enshrined in law, free of direction/control from 
executive, discretion to determine type of work, reporting to parliament not the 
executive, wide information gathering powers, and appointment by parliament - not 
the executive.   
 
The officers enabling legislation as at September 2000 were examined to determine 
whether the accountability mechanisms (Table 1: column 1) and the required powers 
(Table 1: column 2) were or were not explicitly addressed.  The Parliamentary 
Officers Act 1975 was also reviewed.  However, the provisions relating to these 
officers have not been reported upon, as their duties and relationship with the 
parliament  are quite different to other others who may be considered officers of the 
parliament.   
 
To facilitate the comparison across each officer’s enabling legislation, the framework 
as contained in Table 1 was restructured to form the basis of the analyses as 
appearing in the first column of Tables 2 to 5.  Tables 2 to 5 provide a summary of 
the key features of the enabling legislation of each officer under the separate 
accountability mechanisms and required powers.  A total of thirty issues are 
contained within these tables.  The enabling legislation was then examined to 
determine the extent to which the issues as contained in Tables 2 to 5 were 
addressed.  To validate our findings in terms of accuracy and errors, the relevant 
parts of Tables 2 to 5 were sent to each officer.  Comments were received from each 
officer or a representative, and where necessary and deemed appropriate, 
amendments based on such comments were incorporated in the relevant parts of this 
paper and the tables.   
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It is noted that, by practice or convention, some officers may have more or less 
independence or have more or less accountability to the parliament than suggested by 
the analysis of the legislation alone.  This is because such practice or convention may 
not reflect a literal interpretation and application of the enabling legislation.  An 
examination of instances where such variations between practice and the legislative 
provision occur is beyond the scope of the present study.  However, as an example of 
where such a divergence was found, the Commonwealth auditor-general, by 
convention, presents an annual work plan to parliament without there being a 
legislative requirement to do so.  It is only in the case of the auditor-general of 
Victoria that a legislative requirement to submit an annual plan to parliament exists. 
   
Accountability Mechanism Available to Parliament 
 
1. Powers of Parliament in Relation to Victorian Officers of Parliament 
 
Table 2 shows a number of differences between the four Victorian officers in relation 
to the powers of parliament.  Although consistency appears over the appointment and 
removal of the officers, there are significant differences in other areas.  Of note is the 
degree of difference in the terms of office, eligibility for re-appointment, and in the 
requirement for an annual work plan.  A more detailed description follows below.   
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
(a) Appointment  
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For each officer examined, the appointment to the position is by the governor- in-
council.  In the case of the auditor-general the legislation further provides that the 
appointment by the governor-in-council is on the recommendation of the 
parliamentary committee (that is, the PAEC).  In the case of the regulator-general, 
associate regulators-general may be appointed, with these appointments being made 
by the minister rather than the governor- in-council.   
 
(b) Term of Office 
The legislation reveals differences in the periods for which the officers may be 
appointed, and their eligibility for re-appointment.  The auditor-general is appointed 
for seven years; the director of public prosecutions is to be appointed for at least ten 
years and at most twenty years; the ombudsman is appointed for a term of ten years; 
whilst the regulator-general is appointed for five years.  The appointment of the 
auditor-general and the director of public prosecutions are provided for in the 
Constitution Act 1975, whereas the other officers’ appointment is provided for in 
their respective enabling legislation.   
 
(c) Eligibility for re-appointment 
The ombudsman is the only officer not eligible for re-appointment.   
 
(d) Remuneration 
Remuneration for the auditor-general, the ombudsman, and regulator-general is 
determined by the governor- in-council.  In the case of the director of public 
prosecutions, salary and allowances are determined under the Judicial Remuneration 
Tribunal Act 1995.   
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(e) Payments out of Consolidated Fund 
In terms of the source of funds for these payments, the auditor-general, the director 
of public prosecutions, and the ombudsman are paid from the Consolidated Fund.  
The legislation is silent on this matter in respect of the regulator-general. 
 
(f) Removal from office 
Removal of each officer can only be by parliament.   
 
(g) Appointment of Acting Officers 
The appointment of an acting officer is by the governor-in-council, which is the same 
as the process for appointing the substantive office holder.      
  
(h) Submission of annual work plan 
The auditor-general is the only officer examined required to submit an annual plan 
describing the proposed work program for that year to the parliament; with the draft 
plan being subject to consideration and comment by the parliamentary committee.  
The auditor-general is then required to report upon the performance of that plan 
following that year.  The other parliamentary officers do not appear to be subject to 
any parliamentary or ministerial direction as to an annual work plan.  The director of 
public prosecutions must consult with the director’s committee before making a 
special decision.  The regulator-general is required to consult the minister prior to 
conducting an inquiry.  In all other respects, the other parliamentary officers do not 
appear to be required to consult or confer in planning or determining their work 
program. 
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The director of public prosecutions is responsible to the attorney-general for the due 
performance of his or her functions and exercise of his or her powers under the Act.  
It is not clear what the implications of this provision are in terms of determining the 
effective relationship between the director of public prosecutions and the attorney-
general, and in particular the independence of the director of public prosecutions. 
 
(i) Power to request investigations or audits 
In the case of the ombudsman, the legislation provides that the Legislative Council, 
Legislative Assembly, or a joint committee of both houses of parliament, may refer 
to the ombudsman any matter for investigation or report (Ombudsman Act 1973 
Section 16).  In the case of the regulator-general, the minister may request inquiries.   
 
(j) Tabling of annual reports 
In terms of provisions relating to annual reporting, the auditor-general and the 
ombudsman are to submit an annual report directly to the parliament; while the 
director of public prosecutions submits annual reports to the attorney-general for 
tabling in parliament.  The regulator-reneral is to produce an annual report, however 
the legislation is silent regarding the provisions for the submission of this annual 
report to parliament or the relevant minister.  The Committee of Public Prosecutions 
also submits an annual report to the attorney-general which is to be laid before 
parliament. 
 
(k) Submission of other reports 
In respect of other forms of reports, the auditor-general submits all audit reports to 
the parliament.  The ombudsman also submits his/her other reports directly to the 
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parliament.  However, the regulator-general submits reports of inquiries to the 
minister for tabling in parliament; whilst the director of public prosecutions does not 
appear to be subject to a provision requiring submission of other reports.  Further, the 
ombudsman may be authorised to publish any report relating to the exercise of his 
functions. 
 
2. Funding of Offices 
 
Table 3 shows that for the auditor-general, funding is determined in consultation with 
the PAEC, whereas costs for performance audits for authorities are to be paid out of 
the money appropriated to the parliament.  In the case of the ombudsman, parliament 
is to appropriate funds for use by the Office of the Ombudsman.  Whereas for the 
director of public prosecutions and the regulator-general, the relevant legislation 
appears to be silent in respect of the funding of the office.   
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
3. Oversight of Offices 
 
Table 4 shows that the Office of the Auditor-General is subject to an independent 
audit in respect of the financial statements each year, as well as being subject to an 
independent performance audit at least every three years, with the independent 
auditor being appointed by the parliament.  Both the independent financial statement 
auditor and the performance auditor are to report to parliament.  All other offices are 
subject to independent audit conducted by the auditor-general.  However, the 
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relevant legislation for each officer other than the auditor-general does not explicitly 
refer to the conduct of an audit. 
 
Insert Table 4 about here 
 
Powers to Perform Functions  
 
4. Mandate to Perform Functions 
 
Since the functions performed by the various officers differ, it is difficult to draw 
comparisons about the extent to which the relevant legislation provides a 
comprehensive mandate to those officers to perform their respective functions.  
There are, however, differences between the extent to which these officers may 
perform their mandate at their own discretion without being subject to the direction 
of the parliament (or its committees).  For example, in respect of the planning of their 
work (such as, the auditor-general being required to consult with the PAEC on the 
annual work plan), or in terms of being subject to requests to perform specific 
investigations or audits (see above section: Powers of Parliament in Relation to 
Victorian Officers of Parliament).  
 
5. Independence from Direction by Parliament or its Committees 
 
Table 5 shows both similarities and differences in issues affecting the independence 
of each officer from direction by parliament or its committees.   
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Insert Table 5 about here 
 
(a) Independence enshrined in law 
The auditor-general, under the provisions of the Constitution Act 1975, is an 
independent officer of the parliament.  Similarly the Office of the Regulator-General 
is not subject to the direction or control of the minister in respect of any 
determination, report or inquiry.  The director of public prosecutions and the 
ombudsman do not appear to have any provision for the explicit enshrinement of 
their independence from direction provided with the relevant legislation.   
 
(b) Discretion to perform functions 
The relevant legislation provides for discretion in varying degrees for the officers 
under consideration.  The auditor-general has very explicit provision for discretion, 
contained within the Constitution Act 1975, which provides “complete discretion” in 
the performance or exercise of functions or powers and is not subject to direction 
from anyone in relation to: whether or not a particular audit is conducted; the way a 
particular audit is to be conducted; or the priority to be given to any particular matter.  
The director of public prosecutions does not appear to have explicit provision to 
exercise discretion, however, this provision may be seen as being implicit, for 
example having the power to discontinue criminal proceedings.  The ombudsman has 
discretion to conduct inquiries and investigations and regulate procedures.  The 
regulator-general has the discretion to conduct inquiries as deemed fit.   
 
(c) Access to information 
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The enabling legislation for auditor-general, the ombudsman, and the regulator-
general make such a provision.  There are, however, differences in the wording of 
this provision and exemptions to compliance.  The ombudsman has power to gather 
any information except any information that a person is not compelled to produce 
before a court.  The regulator-general has power to obtain information and 
documents except where compliance may tend to incriminate a person.  The enabling 
legislation for the director of public prosecutions does not in the same way explicitly 
provide such a provision.  However, it is likely that other legislative authority 
provides this power to the director of public prosecutions.  It is noted that the 
ombudsman has no access to any deliberations of ministers and parliamentary 
committees in the performance of his duties.  In the case of the auditor-general, there 
is no apparent limitation to call for persons or documents.  However, the auditor-
general does not have the authority to access information held by private sector 
contractors relating to services provided by such contractors to public sector 
agencies.  This may be seen as a serious limitation in an era when contracting out is 
prevalent.   
 
(d) Power to engage consultants and contractors  
Each officer has the power to delegate the powers of that office.  In the case of the 
auditor-general, the legislation provides the further explicit provision that the 
auditor-general may engage persons on a contract basis to conduct audits.  Similarly, 
the regulator-general explicitly has the power to engage consultants.   
 
(e) Determining terms and conditions of staff 
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For each officer the enabling legislation is silent on the matter of determination of 
the terms and conditions of staff.  In the case of the auditor-general, the PAEC has 
the power to exempt the auditor-general from the employment provisions generally 
applicable to government agencies.  This is not the same as the auditor-general 
directly having the power to determine the terms and conditions of staff.   
 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
Following on from JCPA (1996, 1989), English and Guthrie (2000), and De Martinis 
and Clark (forthcoming), this study used a two-part independence and accountability 
framework as a basis to examine the enabling legislation of four Victorian statutory 
officers of parliament with regard to independence, mandate, and funding issues.  
This comparative analysis comprised the auditor-general, the director of public 
prosecutions, the ombudsman, and the regulator-general.  Whether or not these 
particular officers should have the status of officers of parliament, and the associated 
independence and accountability, was not explored.  Rather, the approach was to 
evaluate the adequacy of the provisions of their enabling legislation in terms of 
independence and accountability should they be considered to be officers of the 
parliament.  The first part of the framework provided an assessment of the 
accountability mechanism available to parliament with reference to scope, powers of 
parliament (in relation to requesting and tabling of reports), funding, and oversight.  
The second part provided an assessment of the powers and independence required by 
such officers to perform their function based on the extent of mandate, independence 
from direction by the executive, and funding.   
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This analysis revealed areas where such provisions may be further strengthened 
through amendments in the enabling legislation.  For example, the director of public 
prosecution’s remuneration determination process, the ombudsman’s eligibility for 
re-appointment, and the regulator-general’s term of office.  Also found was the 
requirement for only one officer, the auditor-general, to submit an annual work plan 
to parliament.  Arguably this is a requirement that may be seen to inhibit the scope 
and independence of the auditor-general.  Other notable differences exist in relation 
to the powers of parliament to request investigations or audits, and in the case of the 
director of public prosecutions and the regulator-general, an absence of explicit 
reference to funding mechanisms.  However, the most important difference identified 
was that two of the four officers, the auditor-general and the regulator-general, have 
their independence enshrined in law.   
 
Overall, most of the deficiencies exist because the enabling legislation is silent (that 
is, the dominance of the ‘not explicitly stated’ entry).  Therefore, such deficiencies 
could be addressed through appropriate amendments to the enabling legislation that 
explicitly address the issues. 
 
It is acknowledged that, in general, some legislative provisions give rise to specific 
obligations or actions that can be readily observed and measured.  For example, 
provision for all audit reports to be tabled in parliament.  However, there are other 
legislative provisions that may be little more than symbolic statements.  For example, 
reference to the auditor-general being an “independent officer of the parliament”.  
Arguably, the outcomes of such symbolism may not be measurable in a quantitative 
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manner because evidence does not readily exist to support the effectiveness of such 
symbolism.  
 
 Finally, based on findings of this study, two possible reform options for 
strengthening the enabling legislation are suggested.  The first option is to enact a 
‘Statutory Officers of the Parliament Act’ that would establish a legislative 
framework for all statutory officers of parliament within the jurisdiction.  Although 
such a legislative framework is possible, it may be necessary to recognise within the 
current individual legislation the different function of each office in the context of 
such a broad legislative framework.  The second option is to adopt a set of principles 
that form the basis of amendments to each separate act for statutory officers of 
parliament.  This overcomes the need to develop an overall legislative framework for 
all officers of parliament within the jurisdiction.  Yet, at the individual level, all 
officers of parliament would have enshrined in law the minimum level of power and 
independence to perform their duties, and parliament is provided with the necessary 
minimum level of accountability mechanisms.   
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Figure 1: Main Channels of Public Accountability 
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Table 1: Accountability Mechanisms Available to Parliament Related to Audit 
Mandate, Independence and Funding* 
 
Accountability Mechanisms Available to Parliament 
 
Powers Required by Auditors-General 
 to Conduct Audits 
 
 
Scope of audit in the public sector 
§ No impediment to AG conducting financial statements and 
performance audits of all government entities 
 
 
 
 
Powers of parliament in relation to audit 
§ Parliamentary audit committee to appoint, oversee AG and 
his/her office 
§ Power to request audits 
§ All audit reports to be tabled in the parliament 
§ Recognition that parliament is the client, not the executive 
or auditee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Funding determined by parliament 
§ Funding determined by parliament via input from 
parliamentary audit committee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oversight of AG 
§ Independent audit of AG 
 
 
Mandate to perform audits 
1. Financial statement audits of agencies 
2. Performance audits of agencies 
3. Financial statement audits of authorities and companies 
4. Performance audits of authorities and companies 
 
 
Independence from direction by the executive  
1. Independence enshrined in law 
2. Free of direction/control from executive 
3. Discretion to determine type of audit and auditee 
4. Reporting to parliament not the executive 
5. Wide information gathering powers 
6. Audit committee of parliament to advise on audit 
priorities and oversee audit function 
7. Appointment of the AG by parliament not the 
executive 
8. AG an officer of the parliament 
9. ANAO a statutory authority and AG to determine terms 
and conditions of employment of staff 
 
Funding of AG 
1. Sufficient to enable AG to exercise effective mandate 
2. Funding level recommended by parliamentary audit 
committee not by treasury 
3. No cost recovery from auditees 
 
 
 
 
1. Parliament to appoint independent auditor of AG 
2. Independent auditor to report to parliamentary audit 
committee 
 
*Source:  English and Guthrie (2000) 
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Table 2: Powers of Parliament in Relations to Victorian Officers of Parliament 
 
  Auditor-General Director of Public Prosecutions Ombudsman Regulator-General 
(a) Appointment by  
 
Govenor-in-council*  Govenor-in-council Govenor-in-council Govenor-in-council 
(b) Term of office  7 years 
At least 10 years, at most 
20 years 
10 years 5 years 
(c) Eligible for re-appointment Yes Yes 
No 
 Yes 
(d) Remuneration determined 
by 
Govenor-in-council Judicial Remuneration and Tribunal Act 1995 Govenor-in-council Govenor-in-council 
(e) Officer to be paid out of 
Consolidated Fund 
Yes Yes Yes Not explicitly stated 
(f) Removal from office by  
 
Parliament Parliament Parliament Parliament 
(g) 
Appointment of acting 
officer 
 
Govenor-in-council Govenor-in-council Govenor-in-council Govenor-in-council 
(h) Annual work plan to be 
submitted to parliament 
Yes No No No 
(i) Power to request 
investigations or audits 
Parliament Not explicitly stated Parliament Minister 
(j) Annual reports to be tabled 
directly to parliament 
Yes 
To Parliament via the 
Attorney-General Yes 
Not explicit as to who 
receives the annual 
report 
(k) Submission of other reports 
to 
Parliament No other reports required Parliament Minister 
*  On the recommendation of the PAEC. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Funding of Offices 
 
  Auditor-General Director of Public Prosecutions Ombudsman Regulator-General 
(a) Funding of office 
determined by  
Parliament Not explicitly stated Parliament Not explicitly stated 
  
 
Table 4: Oversight of Offices 
 
  Auditor-General Director of Public Prosecutions  Ombudsman Regulator-General  
(a) Independent financial 
statement audit 
Yes Not explicitly stated Not explicitly stated Not explicitly stated 
(b) Independent performance 
audit 
Yes Not explicitly stated Not explicitly stated Not explicitly stated 
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Table 5: Independence from Direction by Parliament or its Committees 
 
  Auditor-General Director of Public 
Prosecutions  
Ombudsman  Regulator-General  
(a) Independence enshrined in 
law 
Yes Not explicitly stated Not explicitly stated Yes 
(b) Discretion to perform 
functions 
Yes Not explicitly stated Yes Yes 
(c) Access to information No restrictions evident 
Not explicitly stated as 
to variety of information 
accessible 
Restricted Restricted 
(d) Power to engage 
consultants and contractors  
Yes Not explicitly stated Not explicitly stated Yes 
(e) Determining terms and 
conditions of staff 
Not explicitly stated Not explicitly stated Not explicitly stated Not explicitly stated 
 
 
 
 
 
